Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 7

1929

Case Comments
Kentucky Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Kentucky Law Journal (1929) "Case Comments," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 18: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol18/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

CASE COMMENTS
A.PLLATE PRAoTicE--FiNAL

OsDms.-The Christian County Board

of Education passed a resolution reciting an indebtedness and stating
it would be impossible to pay more than a part thereon, and resolving
it would issue its bonds for the balance of the debt. Plaintiff below, a
citizen and taxpayer, filed this equity action in the Christian circuit
court praying that defendant be put upon proof of estimating the indebtedness and if so established that defendant be restrained from
issuing the bonds and from paying it in any other way than at such
A
times as defendant finds itself in funds to liquidate the same.
it
defendant
waiving
without
and
the
petition
to
demurrer was filed
filed its answer.
The trial court sustained the demurrer, denying the injunction,
but did not dismiss the petition. Held on appeal, the mere sustaining
of a demurrer without further action by the court is not a final judgment from which an appeal to this court may be taken. King v.
Christian County Board of Education, 16 S. W. (2nd) 1053.
We find the law in this state is well settled upon this question as
is seen in, Autry v. Autry, 191 Ky. 42, 229 S. W. 79. "It is now well
settled by a number of opinions of this court that merely sustaining
or overruling a demurrer to a pleading, without being followed with
the granting of other final relief, is not such a final one as will
authorize an appeal." See also, Bodes v. Yates, 151 Ky. 162, 151 S. W.
359, and "Final Orders" defined in the Ky. Civil Code, 368 (4).
Other jurisdictions are in accord with the Kentucky courts as is
shown in, Haf$ling v. Williamson, 57 So. 79, an Alabama case in which
it was held that a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint,
without any further step, is not a final judgment and so no appeal will
lie from it. Also, Williams v. Huey, 263 Ill. 275, 104 N. R. 1008; In re
Larson's Estate, 77 Neb. 438, 109 N. W. 752; Bills v. Reeder, 58 Wash.
695, 107 Pac. 1055; and Morris v. Dunbar, 149 Fed. 406, (a case from
Penn.) In Morris v. Dunbar, defendant filed a demurrer to plaintiff's
declaration, which demurrer was sustained with leave to plaintiff "to
discontinue on payment of costs", but it did not appear that there had
ever been a discontinuance, or that defendant had ever entered judgment against plaintiff prior to suing out this writ of error. It was
held, that the order was not such a final judgment as would support
A. J. A.
the writ.
APELAT PRAoCIc--PnnSu30oNS AS TO QUESTINS OF FAc
Wxanm lsconn is IwcorxLErw.--On appeal certain depositions considered by the lower court, at the trial, were missing from the transcript. Plaintiff in her appeal seeks to controvert findings of fact by
the lower court which she alleges were proved by the evidence omitted
from the transcript upon which the appeal is based. Held: where the
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record brought to the appellate court is incomplete, it will be presumed that the missing parts support the judgment of the chancellor.
Harmon v. Harmon, 227 Ky. 341, 13 S. W. (2nd) 242.
The Kentucky Court has consistently held that where depositions
are considered in rendering a decree, by the lower court, they must
be presumed to have supported the decree, unless the depositions are
sent up to the appellate court or copied into the transcript. In Hhannorn
v. ,traton, 144 Ky. 26, 137 S. W. 850, the court in dealing with this
problem said, "Where the bill of evidence containing the oral evidence
has been stricken from the files . . . . the presumption is that the
evidence heard by the trial court sustains the judgment."
While the appellant is not required to bring up the entire record,
the rule is well settled, in Kentucky, that one who prosecutes an appeal upon a partial transcript does so at his peril; and, if it appears
that a part of the testimony used upon the trial is not copied in the
transcript, it will be presumed, in support of the judgment, that it
would sustain the averments of the appellee's pleadings. Sublett v.
91 Ky.
Gardner'sAdm'r., 164 Ky. 385, 175 S. W. 628; McIKee v. Stin,
240, 16 S. W. 583; Hanson v. Connolly, 141 Ky. 120, 132 S. W. 159;
Hall v. Mineral Development Co., 31 Ky. Law Rep. 863, 104 S. W. 284;
Tutt v. Kincaid, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 389.
This rule is supported by the Federal Court in Titus v. Maxwell,
281 Fed. 433, where the district judge considered a summary of evidence, but no summary was sent to the appellate court, and the appellate court assumed that the summary contained substantially no
more than was shown by the referee's findings.
The rule in the instant case is in complete accord with the adjudications in other jurisdictions.
Thompson v. Commercial Union Assurance- Company, 20 Colo.
App. 331, 78 P. 1073; Estes v. Nell, 140 Mo. 639, 41 S. W. 940; Cooper
v. Cooper, 201 Ala. 475, 78 So. 381; Hundstrom v. Weinrich, 207 Ill.
E. D. D.
App. 313.
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Plaintiff sued out an attachment against the defendant and an automobile was levied on as the property of the defendant. The defendant
held a bill of sale from the former registered owner of the car and at
the time of the levy the car was registered in the name of the defendant.
There was evidence, however, tending strongly to show that at the time
of the levy the automobile belonged to a third party who purchased
it from the defendant. Such transaction was not, however, a matter
of record. Held, that even though the car was registered in the defendant's name, in compliance with the state statute, this was not conclusive proof of the ownership of the vehicle. Moore v. Wilson, 230 Ky.
49, 18 S. W. (2nd) 873.
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This seems to be the first time that this precise question has ever
confronted the Kentucky court. No Kentucky cases were cited in the
written opinion as precedents for the holding in the instant case and
a search through the adjudicated cases failed to reveal any in point.
No cases could however be found adhering to an opposite view so it
may fairly well be assumed that later Kentucky decisions will follow
the rule as laid down in the present case.
Federal authority on this subject seems to be entirely lacking. We
have, however, quite a few decisions from the various states bearing
on this point and almost without exception the state courts have held
that a license number on a motor vehicle, though not conclusive, is
nevertheless prima facie evidence of the ownership thereof in the
person whose name appears in the corresponding certificate of registration on file in the proper office. Commonwealth v. Sherman, 191 Mlass.
439, 78 N. E. 98; Hufft v. Dougherty,*184 Mo. App. 374, 171 S. W. 17;
Williams v. Stringfield, 76 Colo. 343, 231 P. 658; CarolinaDiscount Corp.
v. Landis Motor Corp., 190 N. C. 157, 129 N. D. 414; HennessA v.. Automobile Owners' Ins. Ass'n, 282 S. W. 791, 46 A. L. R. 521; Whimster
v. Holmes, 177 Mo. App. 130, 164 S: W. 236. In Ferrisv. Sterling, 214
N. Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406, the court said, "The license number of the car
coupled with evidence that the defendant held the license, was prima
facie proof that the defendant was the owner."
The holding in the present case is supported by an almost unbroken line of authorities. It is submitted that the rule is sound both
on reason and principle and more likely to do justice in a majority of
the cases than any other rule that could be formulated on the subject.
B. B. A.
A Ourmomron
S-RHT OF PERSON TO OPERATE CoMMoN CARIR FOR
Hnm ON THE PuRLa HIHwAvs.-Action was instituted by the Safety
Coach Transit Corporation, authorized under convenience and necessity
to operate motor coaches for transportation of passengers for hire,
against S., a taxicab operator, to enjoin him from engaging in unfair
and illegal competition with the Safety Coach Corp. The circuit court
granted the relief sought and, S. appeals. It is claimed S. has a right
to drive his own automobile upon the public highway for the carriage
of persons and the transportation of property; that suclA right to conduct a lawful business is a property right protected by the federal co)stitution against impairment or interference. Held, though a person
may have a right under the federal constitution to travel and transport property upon highways by motor vehicle, he has no right to
make the highways his place of business by using them as a common
carrier for hire. Blusher v. Safety Coach Tarnsit Co., 17 S.'W. (2nd)
1012.
The state may prohibit the use of highways for private business
or grant the right to one and refuse it to another, under its police
power. Harrisonv. Big Four Bus Lines, 21 Ky. 119, 288 S. W. 1049.
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Public highways are public property, and their regulation, and ise
is a proper exercise of police power, and further, a common carrier
engaged in transportation of persons or property for profit has no
vested or inherent right in highways, and their unrestrained use is
equivalent to appropriation of public property for private use, which
may be prohibited or regulated by the legislature. Reo Bus Lines Co.
v. Soutiern Bus Lines Co. 109 Ky. 42, 272 S. W. 18.
Although there are a limited number of Kentucky cases in point
with the question herein presented we find that those in which the
question arise have been decided in accord with the principal case, and
the same is found throughout the. other jurisdictions. So, in Scott v.
Hart,128 Miss. 353, 91 So. 17, . . ."no private individual or corporation may use streets in the prosecution of the business of carrier for
private gain without the consent of the state or municipality nor except
upon the terms and conditions they have prescribed; the use of streets
as a place of business being accorded as a mere privilege and not as
a natural right." See also, City of San Antonio v. Fetzer, 241 S. W. 1034;
Taylor v. Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S. E, 259.
The right of a common carrier, as such, to use streets is a mere
license or privilege which the Legislature may prohibit entirely, without violating the federal or state Constitution. Hadfield v. Lundin, 98
Wash. 673, 168 Pac. 516.
This line of decisions is followed by both the Federal and U. S.
Supreme courts where the question has arisen, as in Schoenfeld vs.
Czty of Seattle, 265 Fed. 726; and Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 69
L. Ed. 596.
The cases seem to be quite in accord upon this phase of the question
and those herein cited fairly present the relative rights of the state,
A. J. A.
the carrier, and competitors.
BASTAnDS-ADwinSSIannY OF DECLARATION OF SPOUSES TO PROVE
ILu.rrnrAo.-Appellant and appellee were legally married. Thereafter they were temporarily separated, appellant abiding with her
parents. There was evidence proving that appellee repeatedly visited
appellant during this temporary separation. During said period appellant became pregnant. Question: may the appellee by virtue of this
access and marriage be deemed the father of said child and consequently
be legally entitled to participate in the division of said issue's property?
Held, that evidence could not be introduced tending to illegitimatize a
child born in wedlock where such evidence is not preceded by proof of
non-access of the spouses. Vernon's Administrator et al. v. Vernon, 228.
Ky. 56, 14 (2nd.) S. W. 185.
It has long been held in, Kentucky that childreA born to a mother
in wedlock are presumed legitimate. North Cumberland. Manufacturing Co. v. Sergent, 112 Ky. 888, 66 S. W. 1036. However, this presumption may be overcome by proof of non-access of the spouses,
Wilson v. Wilson, 174 Ky. 771, 193 S. W. 7; or by establishing fim-
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potency of the male spouse, Goss v. Froman, 89 Ky. 318, 12 S. W. 387;
or by the circumstances of a mulatto being born to a white mother who
is married to a man of a like kind, Sergent v. North Cumberland Co.,
supra.
There is a conflict in the various jurisdictions upon the point
passed upon by the instant court, but the holding is obviously with
the majority view. The rule is supported by the following authorities:
State v. Hillenberg, 85 Va. 245, 7 S. E. 377; Scanlan v. Walsh, 81 Md.
118, 31 A. 498; Kentucky v. Catoe, 68 S. C. 470, 47 S. E. 719; Wright v.
Hicks, 15 Ga. 160, 6 Amd. 687; Pattersonv. Gaines, 6 Howard 550, 12 L
Ed. 553.
The opposing view., viz., that evidence may be introduced to
illegitimatize children born to mothers in wedlock where there is no
proof of non-access, is represented by these authorities: Stegall v.
Stegall, 22 F. Cas. No. 13, 351, 2 Brock 256; Lay v. Fuller,178 Ala. 375,
59 S. 609; Cooley v. Cooley, 58 S. C.. 168, 36 S. E. 563.
The English rule is in accord with the instant court and is stated
thus: "A child born in wedlock is, in the first instance, presumed to be
legitimate. The presumption thus established by law is not to be
rebutted by circumstances which only create doubt and suspicion, but
it may be wholly rebutted by showing that the husband was: first, incompetent; second, entirely absent, so as to have no intercourse or
communication of any kind with the mother; third, entirely absent
at the period during which the child must, in the course of nature,
have been begotten; fourth, only present under such circumstances
as afford clear and satisfactory proof that there was no sexual inter0. S. M.
course. Hargrove v. Hargrove, 9 Beav. 552, 50 Rep. 457.
BouIDAnIEs-CounEss AND DISTAxCES YIELD TO KNoWN OBJEcTs IN
LOCATING BoUNDAiEs.-The appellant conveyed to the appellee a plot
of land, of which the description of the boundaries in the deed called
for a "stake in the barnyard lot" as one of the corners of two more
lots as well as the one in question. Appellee followed out the courses
and distances called for in the deed and found a discrepancy between
them and the call for "the stake in the barnyard lot." If he ignored
the call for the "stake," his southern boundary would be extended one
hundred feet south of Where it would be otherwise. He began removing the fence, and the appellant brought an action of trespass to quiet
their title. The question resolved itself to a choice between the
courses and distances and the monument. The court in reversing the
decision held that "courses and distances yield to known objects in
locating boundaries." Jacobs et ux v. Johnson, 227 Ky. R. 785, 14 (2nd)
S. W. 200.
This decision is well in accord with a multitude of similar holdings
in prior cases before the Kentucky Court in the last twenty years.
Among them, Alexander v. Hill, 82 Ky. Law Rep. 1147 lOS S. W. 225;
Brashearv. Joseph, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 1139, 108 S. W. 307; Dupoyster
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v. Miller, 160 Ky. 780, 170 S. W. 780; Stacy v. Alexander, 143 Ky. 153,
136 S. W. 150; Gilbert v. Parrott,168 Ky. 509, 182 S. W. 599; Atkinson
v. Murphy, 205 Ky. 138, 265 S. W. 506.
In deciding the case of Traylor and Crate v. Forester,148 Ky. 201.
146 S. W. 428, the court held that "it was a too well settled point of
law to need the citation of authority that courses and distances must
give way to marked objects." The intention of the court is to carry
out as nearly as possible the intention of the parties at the time of the
making of the deed. It is well founded on a logical theory that the
ordinary man would be much more liable to confuse technical measurements than he would the location and existence of markers and monuments with which he would be familiar as the result of passing to and
fro over his premises in the acts of husbandry and overseeing. In
holding similarly in the case of Gilbert v. Parrott, 168 Ky. 599, 182 S.
W. 590, the court makes it plain that it will not adopt a natural object
sought to be established by parol evidence as a beginning corner when
to do so would be to ignore the courses and distances, and the conveyance of much more land than specified in the deed. It is logical to assume that the court would have held similarly in case the monument
were called for in the deed, thereby exercising the reasonable rule,
and implying that the disregarding of the courses and distances for the
monument must not vary greatly the amount of acreage to be conveyed
under the wording of the deed.
The law in this country seems to be in harmony with that set out
by the Kentucky Court. However, the cases involving this point before
the Supreme Court of the United States within the ,last twenty-five
years have been infrequent
The New York Supreme Court in the case of Talifer v. Falk, 173
N. Y. 251, 105 Misc. 6, while reaching a decision in accord with this
case, cautions in the dicta that this rule applies only to a reasonable
degree, and that "monuments control courses and distances is a rule
that is applied as a matter of construction to ascertain the intention
of the parties, and if the intention is plainly manifested otherwise, it
need not be ignored in adherence to such a rule, but that the manifest
intention must control." Thus coinciding with the Kentucky case of
Gilbert v. Parrott, supra, implying that it is a rule to be applied in
order to reach as nearly as possible the core of intention in the making of the deed, and a reasonable balance must be maintained between
the acreage specified in the deed, and that conveyed by the choice of
one of the alternative boundary lines, namely, courses and distances, or
J. N. E.
monuments.
D Po&ToNs-WHEN To BE TAxKEN.-In a suit to enforce a materialman's lien it was shown that appellee took all of his depositions before
he filed his answer. This was the ground of exceptions to the depositions. The answer of appellee set up no affirmative defense but was a
mere denial of the allegations in appellants petition. In the deposition
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to which the exception was made, the appellee went fully into his defense and the appellant was apprised of its nature even more fully than
he was by the answer which was filed later. Held, that court did not
err in overruling exceptions to the depositions since appellant was in
no way prejudiced by failure to observe the provisions of the Civil
Code (Sect. 557) in its strictest sense. Mullins v. Patrick, 229 Ky. 195,
1018.
16 (2nd) S. W.
Section 557 of the Civil Code of Practice provides, "The plaintiff
may commence taking depositions immediately after the service of the
summons; and the defendant immediately after filing his answer."
This provision has been very ably construed and its evident purpose
set out by Judge Carroll in the case of Weisiger v. M111s, 28 Ky. R.
1208, 91 S. W. 689, in which he said, "The evident purpose of this is
that the plaintiff may be apprised of the defense and thereby enabled to
intelligently conduct the cross-examination of the witnesses." In the
case above referred to the objection to the deposition was that the
answer fied had not been verified. The objection was overruled on the
ground that there was nothing in the record to show that appellant
was in any manner prejudiced by failure of appellee to verify hIs
answer before taking depositions.
It seems to be the well settled rule that mere formal defects and
irregularities as to the time of taking or return of depositions are
usually disregarded upon trial. - Stegner v. Blake, 36 Fed. 133; sou.
Fac. Co. v. Wilson, 10 Ariz. 162, 85 Pac. 401; Central By. etc. Co. v.
Gamble, 77 Ga.'584, 3 S. E. 287; Bryant v. Mod. Woadmen of Amer., 86
Nebr. 372, 125 N. W. 621, 27 L. R. A. (N.S.) 326; Semmens v. Walters, b5
But where any act of the party or irregularWisc. 675, 13 N. W. ,889.
jty in the taking works to deprive the adverse party of his right of
intelligent cross-examination, there is good reason for rejecting the
deposition. Starett v. C. and 0. By. Co., 33 Ky. L. R. 309, 110 S. W. 232;
Benmens v. Walters, supra.
While there is no doubt but that the strict language of the statute
has not been complied with, yet we unreservedly agree with the conclusion reached in the instant case. Where the party for whose benefit
this provision was placed in the code has not been prejudiced and
where its evident purpose has been fully satisfied, we see no reason
C. E. B.
whatever, to reach a different conclusion.
F AuD-IxinuRY CAUSED By FRAUD IN THE SAL OF LAND DoEs NOT
RUN WITH THE LAxD.-C conveyed a tract of land which was supposed
to contain 207 acres to W. Later C Conveyed another tract of land to
W at which time C represented to W that if the original tract did not
contain 213 acres he would credit the difference against the notes which
W had given him. Relying on this representation W bought the latter
tract. W sold to his father who also relied on C's representation. The
original tract did not contain the said acreage and W's father asked that
the difference be set off against the notes when C sued. Held: W's
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father as a subsequent grantee could not recover because the injury
caused by C's fraud on W did not run with the land. Walker v. Choate,
228 Ky. 101, 14 (2nd) S. W. 406.
This is the first time that the particular question involved has been
passed upon in Kentucky. There are few cases from other jurisdictions
on the precise problem. Judge Clay in the instant case based his decision on Uonzstock v. Ames, I Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 411, in which it was
said "that a fraud is an individual and personal thing. It is a cause
of complaint to the person only upon whom it is committed." Clough
v. Cook 10 Del. Ch. 175, 87 A. 1017; McKay v. McCarthy, 146 Ia. 546,
123 N. W. 755; De-rasse v. Verona Mining Co. 185 Mich. 514, 152 N.
W. 242. This seems to be a logical basis and conclusion. The cause
of action is in ieoway accessory to the title to the land. It has no
effect on the title to the land but is independent of it. The conveyance to the father carried title alone. Nothing passes by implication or
as appurtenant to the land granted except such rights, privileges, and
easements as are directly necessary to the proper enjoyment of the
granted estate. Odgen v. Jennings, 62 N. Y. 526; Gayetty v. Bethune,
14 Mass. 49; Woodhull v. Rosenthal et al. 61 N. Y. 382; Mill Co. v. Hawley, 44 Ia. 57.
The principle of the instant case applies as well to a case where
fraud is practised upon a donee; Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298 13 Am.
R. 523; and also to a case where a purchaser is injured because of
fraud. Carter v. Harden, 78 Me. 528, 7 A. 392.
In Cheney- v. Dickinson, 72 Fed. 109, officers and promoters of a
corporation made false representations in respect to its property and
affairs in a prospectus in order to induce persons to buy its treasury
stock at par. The court held that one buying stock in reliance on the
representations from another stockholder could not recover from the
corporation for the damage he suffered therefrom. Although this is
not a land case it clearly shows the Federal Court's view on injury from
fraud suffered by a third person who was not a party to the fraudulent transaction. To allow the third party to recover would place a
double liability on the original vendor, because no court will defeat
a recovery in favor of the original vendee. Consequently to refuse the
subsequent grantee a recovery is the best practicable result to be
reached.
Fox v. Hirschfeld, 142 N. Y. S. 261, carries the problem under discussion a little further. A husband conveyed to his wife land which he
bad been induced to purchase by fraudulent representations. The court
decided that the husband's right of action for the fraud did not pass
with the land. The relationship of the vendor and the original vendee
has no effect on the court's conclusion. The court never loses sight
W. C. W.
of the fact that fraud is a personal thing.
CAxNOT BE MADE
GARiS -IENT-STATE HI-axVrY COmnIssIxO
Ghxzsns.-In an action on a promissory note and an open account,
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plaintiff attempted to attach money in the hands of the State Treasurer
due the defendant for work upon State highways. The State highway
commission, auditor of public accounts, and state treasurer were served
as garnishees. Held, attachment discharged on ground that state highway commission is not a body corporate but that it was the state which
was defendant's debtor and that suit was really one against the state.
B. B. Wilson Co. v. Van Diver et al., 230 Ky. 27, 18 S. W, (2nd) 308.
The earliest case in which the present question is decided is that
of Divine v. Harvie, 7 T. B. 1Mbn. 439, 18 Am. Dec. 194. In that case
Harvie, a judgment creditor of Divine's, attempted to subject an appropriation made by the legislature in favor of Divine, to his judgment.
He made Divine, the auditor, and the state treasurer parties defendant.
The language of the court in refusing to allow Harvie's action is very
pertinent: "It seems to be conceded on all hands, that the State cannot be made-a party defendant, and is not suable in her own courts.
"Although the Constitution -has declared, 'that the General Assembly shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may
be brought against the commonwealth yet that body has never complied with this direction; .
.....
.whatever, then, the claims of
Divine may be against the State, and however clearly they may be
acknowledged, the State cannot become a garnishee; . . . .Nor do
we conceive that the auditor and treasurer are proper parties to the
controversy; or that they can be used as a substitute for the State.
They are not officers appointed to defend the interest of the State
generally, although by special act of assembly they may be used as
such."
Tracy and Loyd v. Hornbuckle, 8 Bush 336, holds that the funds
of a school teacher cannot be attached in the hands of a school commissioner.
In-Tate, Treasurer,v. Salmon, 79 Ky. 540, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 359, it
was held that the Commonwealth cannot be sued in her own courts
without special legislative authority, and parties will not be allowed
to evade this rule by ignoring the Commonwealth in their suits and
proceedings against the public officer having the custody of the fund
sought to be reached. To a like effect are Divine v. Harvie, supra;
Tracy v. Hornbuckle, supra;,Rodman v. Musselman, 12 Bushl 336. The
fees, salary, or compensation of - public officer, in the hands of the
disbursing officer of the state, are not subject to garnishment or attachment. Webb v. McCauley, 4 Bush, 8; Allen v. Russell, 78 Ky. 105;
Dickinson v. Johnson, 110 Ky. 236, 61 S. W. 267, 54 L. R. A. 566;
Sanders & Walker v. Herndon et al., 122 Ky. 760, 93 S. W. 14, 5 L. R. A,
(N. S.) 1072.
The principle laid down in the Divine case is that which is followed
in the sister states; O'Niell v. Sewell, 85 Ga. 481, 11 S. E. 831; Dewey
v. Garvey, 130 Mass. 86; Portsmouth Gas Co. v. Sanford, 97 Va. 124, 33
S. E1.516; Keene v. Smith, 44 Or. 525, 75 Pac. 1065; Bank v. Ball, 18
Del. 374, 46 At. 751.
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The reasons for the rule are generally stated as: (1) The general
rule that a State cannot be sued. (2) The public policy argumentthat the state is entitled to the free and unhampered labor of its officers
and servants and that they should not be allowed to be harassed by
attachment or garnishment proceedings. Sanders and Walker v. Herndon, supra.
But where an officer acts under a void act he may be personally
liable, as in Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204. Nor does
a county or municipality enjoy the same immunity from suit as does
the state under the constitution. Allen County v. U. S. Fidelity and
C. E. B.
Guaranty Co., 122 Ky. 825, 93 S. W. 44.

GIFTS-DECEDENT'S Dm'osiT IN BAK, WiTi WRInEN INSTRUCTIoNS
TrAT ox His DEATH MONEY SHOULD BE PAID TO ILLEGITIMATE SON, AS A
GirT INTER Vivos.-Appellant, as administrator of one Turpin filed suit
against appellee to recover for certain pension checks alleged to have
been collected by appellee and appropriated to his own use. Appellee,
inter alia, sought recovery against 'appellant for the amount of a
deposit account with the First National Bank in decedent's name and
which it was alleged said deposits were made with written instructions
entered on the deposit slips of record with the bank that if anything
should happen to him (decedent), or he should die, said sum was to
be paid to the appellee. The lower court peremptorily directed a verdict in favor of appellee for the amount of this deposit. Held error,
since there was neither allegation nor proof that decedent intended to
release control over or part with title to the deposit, and therefore not
a valid gift inter vivos. Turpin's Adi'r v. Stringer, 228 Ky. 32, 14
(2nd) S. W. 189.
The question of just what facts are necessary to constitute a valid
gift inter vivos has been before the Kentucky court in quite a number
of instances and in those cases it has been consistently decided that
the fundamental facts necessary to constitute such a gift are, in brief,
an intention by the donor to transfer title to the property, and a delivery of it to and an acceptance by the donee. Stark v. Kelley, 132 Ky.
376, 113 S. W. 498; Foxworthy v. Adains, 136 Ky. 403, 124 S. W. 381;
Dick v. Harris,Ex'r, 145 Ky. 739, 141 S. W. 56; HaTe v. Hale, 189 Ky.
171, 224 S. W. 1078; Anderson's Adm'r v. Darland, 192 Ky. 624, 234 S.
W. 205; Dickerson v. Snyder, 209 Ky. 212, 272 S. W. 384; Peter's Adm'r
v. Peters, 224 Ky. 493, 6 S. W. (2nd) 499.
The rule may be stated more fully by a quotation from the opinion
in the case of Foxworthy v. Adams, supra: "The rule is that to constitute a valid gift inter vivos, there must be a gratuitous and absolute
transfer of the property from the donor to the donee, taking effect immediately and fully executed by a delivery of the property to the donor
and acceptance thereof by the donee. Gifts inter vivos have no reference to the future, and go into immediate and absolute effect."
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The intention on the part of the donor to make the gift must be
clear and unmistakable. Hate v. Hale, supra; Moore v. Shiflet, 187 Ky.
7, 216 S. W. 614; Grover v. Grover, 24 Pick. 261, 35 Am. Dec. 319. And
at common law, in the absence of a deed, there must be an actual,
constructive or symbolical delivery of the property to the donee, or to
someone else for him, in execution of the gift and for the purpose of
consummating it, in order to have a valid gift inter vivos. Lewis
County v. Peck State Banc, 31 Ida. 244, 170 Pac. 98; Bruce v. Squires,
68 Kans. 199, 74 Pac. 1102. Such requirements, it would seem, are
founded not only on the grounds of public policy and convenience but
to prevent fraud, mistake, perjury and imposition and upon the further
fact that, until delivery, the gift is revocable and title does not pass.
The Kentucky court is in line with the almost unanimous weight
of authority relative to the fundamental essentials of a valid gift inter
vivos. Hicks v. Meadows, 193 Ala. 246, 69 So, 432; Jones v. Crisp, 109
Md. 30, 71 Atl. 515; Bailey v. New Bedford Inst'n for Savings, 192 Mass.
564, 78 N. E. 648; Magee v. Knight, 194 Mass. 546, 80 N. E. 620, 120 Am.
St. Rep. 573; Green v. Hynes, 42 Cal. App. 198, 183 Pac. 568; Grady v.
Sheehan, 256 Pa. 377, 100 Atl. 950.
It is almost impossible by any line of logical reasoning to attack
the rule laid down and, in the application of the rule to the facts in
the instant case, the result reached is clearly correct.
C. E. B.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-FALSE

WORDS

IMPUTING

UNFITZTESS FOR

EU-

PLOYmNT ARE AcTixOABLE PE. sE.-Defendant company wrote upon a
blackboard near the entrance to their buildings the words:
"Ingle
discharged for drinking." Ingle brought his action for slander and
defendant demurred on the ground that the words were not actionable.
The court held: Words falsely spoken or written are actionable per se,
if they impute unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment, or if they prejudice a person in his profession or trade. LouisviZle Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Ingle, 229 Ky. 573, 17 (2nd) S. W.
709.
The instant case represents the general rule throughout the United
States. The courts, however, recognize a marked distinction between
libel and slander without giving any reason therefor. It has been said
that the distinction is the result of historical accident. Whether such
is true is not for the writer to say. We must take the law as it is.
Any defamatory matter if written is prima facie libellous, whereas, if spoken it might not be prima facie slanderous. In some cases
of slander special damage will have to be proved. The courts have
applied the distinction for at least two centuries. The foundation for
such was laid in the time of Charles II. Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt.
364, 128 Eng. Rep. 367; Colby v. Reynolds, 6 Vt. 489, 27 Am. Dec. 574;
Shelton v. Nance, 7 B. Mon. 129; Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 225. Consequently it can be said actionable words, whether written or spoken,
are of two types: (1) Those actionable in themselves without proof
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of special damage or injury; and (2) Those that are actionable only by
reason of some actual special damage sustained by the party slandered.
There are five classes of words upon which actions can be sustained
prima facie.
(1)
Those falsely spoken imputing the commission of a crime
involving moral turpitude, for which the party might be indicted and
punished;
(2)
Those imputing unfitness to perform the duties of an office or
employment;
Those imputing an infectious disease, likely to exclude him
(3)
from society;
(4)
Those prejudicing him in his profession or trade;
(5)
Those tending to disinherit- him.
The above classes are outlined in Pollard v. Liyon, 91 U. S. 225;
Smallwood v. York, 163 Ky. 142, 173 S. W. 380; Spears v. McCoy, 155
Ky. 1, 159 S. W. 610; United Mine Workers of America v. Cromer, 159
Ky. 608, 167 S. W. 891; Burdicke "Law of Torts" pages 360 to 381.
A distinction has been adopted in England between an office of
profit and one of honor alone. The specific rule there is: The one
suing must have been injured while holding an office in which he had a
pecuniary interest. Alexander v. Jenkins, (1892) L. R. Q. B. 797. Such
distinction has not been expressly accepted in the United States, but
the doctrine is always applied where offices of profit are involved.
The principle of the instant case covers several types of officers
and employes. They are:
(1)
Officers in general; Shummway v. Warnick, 108 Neb. 652, 189
N. W. 301; Hancock v. Mitchell, 83 W. Va. 156, 98 S. E. 65.
(2)
Executive and employes; Aronson v. Baldwin, 178 Mich. 565,
146 N. W. 206.
(3)
Legislative officers; Worner v. Fuller, 245 Mass. 520, 139 N.
E. 811.
(4) Judicial officers; Carter v. King, 174 N. C. 549, 94 S. E. 4.
(5)
Corporation and association officers; Fitzgerald v. Pittle, 180
Wis. 625, 193 N. W. 86.
(6)
Employes in general; Marksberry v. Weir, 173 Ky. 316, 190
S. W. 1108.
There are three defenses available to a defendant in libel and
slander cases: 1. Truth; 2. Privilege; and 3. Fair comment. Burdike's "Law of Torts" (4th. Ed.) page 381 to 405. In the absence of any
of these defences the writer sees no injustice, impracticableness, or un.
W. C. W.
reasonableness in the case under discussion.
INjUNCTIcON-DIscoawoT WHICH

IS PURELY MFENTAL MAY NoT BE

ALEVIATED BY IixJtU1cTIvm REr.-Plaintiff sought an injunction to
restrain the defendants from allowing land to be used for circuses and
side-shows alleging that such use of the land by the defendant interfered with his enjoyment of his property. The ease is not decisive of
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the point as to mental suffering, but the court goes out of the way to
show that such relief would not be granted and reviews the authorities
which uphold the proposition. Dulaney et al. v. Fitzgerald et al., 227
Ky. 566, 13 (2d) S. W. 767.
In Boy(A v. Frankfort, 117 Ky. 199, 111 Am. St. Rep. 240, 77 S. W.
669, an effort to prohibit the establishing of a negra church in a white
residential district met with failure. The courts have also refused to
enjoin the building of a livery stable in close proximity to a church,
saying that the injunction would not issue unless that sought to be
restrained materially interfered with the adjacent owner's enjoyment of
his property. Albany Christian Church v. Wilborn, 112 Ky. 507, 66 S.
W. 285. The injunction will not issue to cover sentimental annoyances.
One must necessarily submit to annoyances incidental to city life, and
risk the march of trade and business progress. It is difficult to strike
the true medium between conflicting interests and the tastes of the
people in a densely populated municipality. The inhabitants must risk
the rise and fall of property occasioned, not by a material invasion of
its physical enjoyment but only by establishment of business or building though accompanied by a sentimental repugnance to the same. It,
as so many matters of law, is a matter of the balancing of conveniences,
and a just regard for the needs of trade and the rights of citizens require that this balance be struck. Pearson and Son v. Bonnie, 209 Ky.
307, 272 S. W. 375, 43 A. L. R. 1166; Enrich v. cfarcucilli, 196 Ky. 495,
244 S. W. 865.
There is language in some of the cases indicating a tendency to
extend the rule to cover sentimental annoyances, but such courts have
not been satisfied with the result to which it logically points and have
been at great pains to rest their decisions on more logical bases. Rowland v. Miller, 139 N. Y. 93, 22 L. R. A. 182, 33 N. E. 765; Goodrich V.
Stareth, 1"08 Wash. 437, 184 Pac. 220; Densmore v. Evergreen Camp, 61
Wash. 230, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 608, 112 Pac. 255, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1206;
Osborn v. Shreveport, 143 La. 932, 3 A. L. R. 955, 79 So. 542; Meagher v.
Kessler, 147 Minn. 182, 179 N. W. 732.
This rule, as settled by the Kentucky courts, would seem to go a
little far in its refusal to grant an injunction for sentimental annoyances. The balance of convenience rule demands that the inconvenience
must not be fanciful or such as would affect a person only of fastidious
taste. It should be such as would affect an ordinary reasonable man,
inconvenience including, to disturb and discomfort. Higgins v. Bloch,
(1925) 213 Ala. 209, 104 So. 429. It would seem that injunctive relief
should be granted if the annoyance is such that it affects the individuals as a whole. Such annoyance or mental discomfort has a
4endency to lower resistance to disease and materially affect that
enjoyment of one's property which is guaranteed by the fundamental
law of our land. Leland v. Turner, (1924) 117 Kan. 294, 230 Pac. 1061.
1
K. F_

CASE COMMENTS
NEGLiGExE--LIABILITY

OF MANUFACTURER

on INSTALLER

OF AN

ARTICLE MANrIESTLY DANGEROUS BECAUSE OF NEGLIGENT CONSTRUtCTION.-

The death of the plaintiff's intestate was caused by the negligent construction and installation of an electric crane, used to carry ice from
the tanks where it was frozen to the storage bins. The intestate was
employed to operate the crane and met with his death while thus engaged, The question to be determined is whether the defendant owed a
duty of care to the purchaser's employee whose duty it was to operate
the crane. Held, that judgment should be for the plaintiff on the ground
that the defendant owed the duty. Payton's Administrator v. Childer's
Electric Company, 228 Ky. 44, 14 S. W. (2nd) 208.
The general rule, as stated in this case and supported by weight
of authority, is to the effect that "the manufacturer or installer of an
article, which is not inherently dangerous, but which by reason of
negligent construction, is manifestly dangerous when put to the use
for which it was intended, is liable to any person who suffers an injury
therefrom, which injury might have been reasonably anticipated."
Articles and machinery not inherently dangerous but so manufactured or installed as to become dangerous are put on the same basis
as those inherently dangerous. In either case the manufacturer or the
one who installs the machinery is liable to third persons for injury without notice. Kentucky Independent Oil Company v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky.
507, 271 S. W. 570 (1925); Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616
(1911).
This position by the Kentucky court is well supported 13y authority
from other states. Heckel v. Ford Motor Company, 101 N. J. Law 385,
128 A. 241 (1925); Empire Laundry Machine Company, 60 Ind.
App. 379 (1896); Philadelphiaand R. Coal and Iron Co. v. Hayes, 150
Mass, 457. 23 N. D. 225 (1890).
However, the general rule as stated in the federal cases and elsewhere, is to the effect that a contractor, manufacturer or furnisher of
an article is not liable to a third party who has no contractual relation with him in the construction, manufacture or sale of such an
article. Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 (1880); Bragdon v. PerkinsCampbell Company, 87 Fed. 109 (1898); Winterterbottom v. Wright,
10 M. & W. 109 (1842).
But some exceptions to this rule are universally recognized. These
exceptions have become as firmly established as the general rule.
Among the exceptions are: (1) Articles which are inherently dangerous and sold without notice, and (2) articles not inherently dangerous
but which become so by negligent installation. Huset v. J I. Chase
H. H. 1.
Threshing Machine Co, 120 Fed. 865 (1903).
I
PLEADING TO
PLEADi G-Exn
T CANNoT SUPPLY DEFICIENOIN
WnroH rr Is Frrs.-A taxpayer filed a petition against the County
Board of Education challenging the validity of certain indebtedness,
and seeking to restrain the issuance of bonds on this indebtedness.
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The only statement in the petition bearing on this validity'was that the
board that created it "had no authority in law so to do." A copy of a
resolution of the Board containing evidence of certain facts bearing
on the validity of the indebtedness was filed by the plaintiff with his
petition as an exhibit. Trial court sustained defendant's demurrer.
Decision was affirmed on ground that plaintiff in his petition pleaded
conclusions instead of facts. Facts set out in exhibit could not be
taken as supplying the defect in the petition. King v. Christian County
Board of Education, 229 Ky. 234, 16 S. W. (2nd) 1053.
This decision is in harmony with previous rulings on the same
question in this state. That an exhibit filed with a pleading will not
cure material defects in it, nor supply omitted essential averments is
well settled in Kentucky. Altemuns v. Asher, 24 Ky. 2416, 74 S. W. 245;
Newport Lumber Co. v. Lichtenfeldt, 24 Ky. 1969, 72 S. W. 778; Miller
v. McConnell, 26 Ky. L. R. 181, 80 S. W. 1103; Noble v. People's Stock
and Poultry Feed Co., 189 Ky. 549, 225 S. W. 491; Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Hensley, 215 Ky. 45, 284 S. W. 425. The exhibit, however, if it is one
required to be filed under Ky. Code Sect. 120, may cure technical defects, or supply details to an indefinite averment of fact in the pleading. Noble v. People's Stock and Poultry Feed Co., supra; Lowe iv.
Broad Bottom Mining Co., 194 Ky. 88, 238 S. W. 192.
The rules in the various states as to the effect of an exhibit filed
with a pleading are anything but uniform. In many jurisdictions the
Vtrict rule that an exhibit forms no part ot the pleading is followed.
Green v. People, 14 Ill. App. 364; McFadden v. Deck, 193 Ill., App. 178;
31 Cyc. 560. In many jurisdictions, however, if an annexed exhibit is.
properly referred to in the pleading, whatever is contained or properly
recited ,in the exhibit is regarded as though it had been expressly
averred in the pleading. 31 Cyc. 561; Wells v. Wilcox, 68 Iowa 708, 28
N. W. 29.
In the absence of a statutory provision, the procedural question
involved might well be decided either way by the court.
R. L.
PowERs-CoNTRAcT GIViNG PRoPRnTY OF SPOUSES TO SuRvivoR, Wrcn
BIGHT TO SrT AwD REmAiNDNo
To CHILDBn,
AUToRIZED Co iuN=icn
OF FEE BY SuRvvnG HUsRAX.-It was mutually agreed between

husband and wife and evidenced by a written contract, that the
property held jointly by them should go to the survivor with an absolute power of sale, remainder to children. The husband, as survivor,
attempted to convey a fee to the property in question to a third party
and one of the children sued as remainderman for an undivided interest in the property so conveyed. Held, that under the contract the,
survivor could convey a fee without being liable to the children as
remaindermen. MuNens v. Owen, 229 Ky. 471, 17 S. W. (2nd) 416.
It would seem that the Kentucky Court of Appeals has never been
confronted with this precise question before. No case Is cited in the
opinion as a precedent for the holding in the present case. However

CASE COMMENTS
the case of Funkhouser v. Porter,32 Ky. Law Rep. 676, 107 S. W. 202
seems to present a very! similar problem and some of the dicta in that
case would tend strongly to account for the holding in the present
case. In that case the court held that 'where land is given to man and
wife with power of sale, remainder to their children, the man and
wife could mortgage the premises without rendering themselves liable
to the remaindermen. The court said by way of dicta that any sale
of the land by the parents was not exclusive of the children's rights.
The courts in general are inclined to look less closely into any
particular clause of a deed but will, on the contrary, look to the deed as
a whole and attempt to adjudicate the cases coming before them according to the intention of the grantor as manifested in the written instrument as as entirety. In the present case, for instance, the court
pointed out that the contract as a whole could only be construed to
mean that the survivor took a life estate with the absqlute right to
convey a fee regardless of the interest of any remaindermen. D. E. A.

RA-uoAs.--Ry. Co. held not liable for death of trespasser because
engineer blew whistle before applying brakes instead of vice-versa.
Child, a trespasser, was asleep on the track of the railway company.
Engineer, discovering child, blew whistle and then applied the brakes.
The contention was that the brakes should have been applied and then
the whistle blown and thereby the accident might have been avoided.
Held not liable. L. & N. R. Co. v. Mann's Adm'r, 227 Ky. 399, 13 (2nd)
S. W. 257.
This question Is one involved in that duty owed to a trespasser
after his peril is discovered. In the Ky. Traction and Terminal Co. v.
Roschi's Adm'r, 186 Ky. 371, 216 S. W. 579, similar on facts, the court
says defendant through motorman in charge of the car was only required to use such reasonable care as persons of ordinary prudence
and presence of mind would use under like circumstances. Defendant's
employe could not comprehend the whole situation. Such presence of
mind Is not possessed by ordinary men nor available to the defendant,
hence the plaintiff is not entitled to protection in that extreme degree.
Quoted and approved in Ky. Terminal and Traction Co. v. Brackett,
210 Ky. 756, 276 S. W. 828.
This question as settled by the Kentucky courts is in line with the
best reason and the rule using as a test the ordinary reasonable man under like or similar circumstances. It is supported by practically all of
the authorities. In Rainy et at v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., Utah 1924,
231 Pacific 807, the court says, If they (after discovery of peril) did
what in their judgment was proper, neither the court nor the Jury can
hold them liable for a reasonable mistake.
We are not to judge of care exercised under circumstances of this
kind by deliberate retrospect of the facts, because we can never place
ourselves by calm analysis of the features of these occurrences in pre-
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cisely the same frame of agitation as those who are actors in such
K. F.
event. Kirtley v. R. Co., (C. C.) 65 Fed. 386.
TORTS-RIGHT OF PnlvAo.-While the plaintiff and her husband
were walking along the street two men assaulted her husband and
killed him. The plaintiff then attacked the men but they escaped. The
Herald Post published an account of the incident together with the
plaintiff's picture. This was done without the plaintiff's consent, and
some of the statements claimed to have been made by the plaintiff were
incorrect. Held: This was not an invasion of her right of privacy.
"The right of privacy is the right to live one's life in seclusion without
being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity." The court
refused to consider the truth of the statements. fones v. Herald Post
Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2nd) 972.
Although the Kentucky Court was one of the first to recognize the
right of privacy, a case of this kind has not been considered by it
before. But Dean Wigmore discusses this situation in an article in 4
Kentucky Law Journal, 8, 1, entitled "The Right Against False Attributions of Belief or Utterance." In this article he says, "Now the test
of wrongfulness should not be whether this opinion or utterance
falsely attributed, tends to bring a person into hatred, ridicule, or contempt, but whether the opinion ascribed is one which is disagreeable
for the speaker to be supposed to entertain. . . ." Dean Wigmore
further says that the truth of the statment is the important thing to be
considered.
In handing down its decision the Kentucky Court said that there
are times when a person becomes an actor in an incident of public
interest, and he "emerges from his seclusion" and it is not an invasion
of his right of privacy to publish an account of such occurrence. In the
present case the fight of the plaintiff was public, and there was
no invasion of her right of privacy even though she were misquoted.
In regard to the "public interest" doctrine the Kentucky Court is
Brent v.
in accord with the other cases that have considered it.
forgan, 221 Ky. 763, 229 S. W. 967; Carliss v. Walker, 57 Fed. 434. But
as an answer to the question put by Dean Wigmore the case is evidently wrong, for the court should have considered the truth of the
statements. In a case where there is an incident of "public interest"
R. D. D.
the truth is the gist of the matter.

